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Abstract
Most national level referendums in Europe since 1793 are initiated either by politi-
cal elites or by citizens. It remains unclear why these two types of initiators call for 
referendums. This article aims to explain under what circumstances political elites 
and citizens call referendums on domestic policies. The analysis is conducted at 
country level using an original data set that covers 461 national level referendums in 
Europe between 1793 and 2019. It tests the influence of four institutional variables 
that in theory are expected to have a divergent effect for the two types of initiators. 
The experience with direct democracy increases the likelihood to have referendums 
called by elites and reduces the incidence of citizen-initiated referendums. More 
authoritarian countries and longer time passed from referendums in a neighboring 
country explain why political elites initiate referendums. Coalition governments are 
more prone to citizen-initiated referendums on domestic policies compared to sin-
gle-party governments.
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Introduction
The use of national-level referendums has gained momentum in the last three dec-
ades (Altman 2011; Qvortrup 2014b; Morel and Qvortrup 2017). Throughout the 
world, an increasing number of topics is subjected to popular vote ranging from very 
specific issues such as the number of parliamentarians in the legislature to broad 
issues such as state formation or the withdrawal from the European Union. Unless 
they are required by law, i.e., mandatory, referendums provide their initiators the 
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possibility to frame the policy agenda. Statistically speaking, many referendums 
have been initiated either by political elites or by citizens. In Europe, out of the 
national-level referendums organized between 1793 and 2019 roughly one quarter 
were mandatory, i.e., demanded by law. The rest is almost evenly divided between 
the two initiators: 238 referendums were initiated by political elites and 223 by citi-
zens. In the face of this extensive use of referendums, the big question mark is why 
these initiators call referendums.
So far, research has touched upon this question but has not provided a compre-
hensive answer. This is because it focused either on the local level, on single-case or 
single policy and on the reasons behind one type of initiators. First, earlier studies 
looked at causes of citizens’ initiatives and referendums at local level, which provide 
valuable insights about particular processes but cannot be generalized at national 
level (Bowler and Donovan 2000; Gordon 2009; Schiller 2011; Laisney 2012). Sec-
ond, much attention has been paid to the ways in which single policies such as the 
European integration or independence have triggered the use of referendums (Hobolt 
2009; Mendez et al. 2014). Single-case studies have added substantial findings to the 
debate about causes for which referendums are initiated (Kriesi 2005; Elkink et al. 
2017; Bergman 2019), but their thorough contextual explanations lack generalizabil-
ity, Third, earlier studies looked at the two types of initiators separately. On the one 
hand, much has been written about the strategic motives of politicians calling refer-
endums to maximize their power, control the policy agenda, seek electoral support 
or gain legitimacy (Björklund 1982; Walker 2003; Rahat 2009; Gherghina 2019). 
On the other hand, the demands of citizens toward referendums have been usually 
studied as a reaction to what politicians do or as a way to promote a salient issue on 
the public agenda (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Setala and Schiller 2012).
This article seeks to go beyond these approaches and explain under what circum-
stances political elites and citizens call national level referendums on domestic poli-
cies in Europe. By political elites, we understand the representatives elected in high 
office at central level, e.g., head of state, prime minister, cabinet members, or mem-
bers of parliament. In the attempt to overcome the limitations of the three strands of 
literature mentioned above, the article aims to compare and contrast the causes for 
these two types of initiators on the same policy area, i.e., domestic policies. These 
are defined as issues related to constitution, political / electoral system and inte-
rior policies (Silagadze and Gherghina 2020). The analysis is conducted at country 
level using an original data set that covers 461 national level referendums in Europe 
between 1793 and 2019, initiated either by elites or by citizens.1 The referendums 
on domestic policies are more than half (235) of the total. We argue that four insti-
tutional variables can explain the use of referendums on domestic policies: the num-
ber of parties in government, the degree of democracy in the country, the experi-
ence with referendums and the institutional learning / contagion effect. We expect 
to observe different effects for the two initiators because, as explained in the follow-
ing section, political elites and citizens have different sets of incentives. In addition 
to these four main effects, we also control for the ideology of the government and 
1 The last referendum included in this dataset is the one in February 2019 in the Republic of Moldova.
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external shocks since they have been identified by earlier studies as potential drivers 
for referendums. The analysis goes beyond earlier explanations about the occurrence 
of referendums relative to the legislative provisions (Hug 2004). We look at the ref-
erendums that were organized—and thus for which legislation is in place—and we 
seek to understand the circumstances that favor their use from two different perspec-
tives: politicians and citizens.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the 
literature about top-down (elite driven) and bottom-up (citizen driven) referendums. 
It also proposes several theoretical arguments that could explain the use of referen-
dums by the two initiators and formulate four testable hypotheses. Next, we present 
the research design with emphasis on the data, variable measurements and meth-
ods used for analysis. The third section includes the analysis and interpretation of 
results, linking the findings to the theoretical underpinning from the literature. The 
conclusions summarize the key results and discuss the main implications.
Elite versus citizen‑initiated referendums
The use of referendums has increased over time. The legal provisions for referen-
dums and initiatives vary considerably across countries, making direct comparisons 
tricky (Qvortrup 2018). In 2016, out of the 195 independent countries in the world, 
only 37 had no provisions for national referendums (Morel 2018). Institutional pro-
visions for citizens’ initiatives are being increasingly added to new constitutions; 
however, compared to the referendum tool, initiative is far from being universally 
accessible mechanism. Many post-communist countries and only four countries 
in Western Europe have provisions for it (Serdült and Welp 2012). The distinction 
between “top-down” (elites) and “bottom-up” (citizens) referendums, introduced by 
Papadopoulos (1995), refers to the source of initiation: the former is initiated by the 
ruling elite, and the latter is triggered by popular minorities through collection of 
citizens’ signatures. Bottom-up referendums come in two forms: either a new piece 
of legislation is put forward—popular initiatives or a previously passed legislation is 
challenged—abrogative and rejective referendums2 (Kaufmann et al. 2010).
Elite and citizen-initiated referendums differ in their nature, functions, and con-
sequences. Popular votes organized by the elite often seek additional legitimacy for 
policies molded within representative institutions. Once a policy takes the referen-
dum hurdle, it acquires more legitimacy and credibility, since its support extends 
beyond the parliamentary circle (Papadopoulos 1995, p. 433). Apart from gaining 
legitimacy top-down referendums are applied as a tool for mediation in order to set-
tle conflicts within parties or coalitions over a contradicting issue and thus, uncouple 
it from future electoral campaigns, to enhance one’s political influence via show-
ing a wide popular support for the suggested policy (Björklund 1982; Rahat 2009). 
Consequently, top-down referendums are held infrequently and only in the situations 
2 Abrogative referendums are held on enacted laws, whereas rejective referendums – on passed but yet 
not in force laws.
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where the government considers it as an useful ad hoc solution to a certain constitu-
tional or political problem (Butler and Ranney 1978).
Citizen-initiated referendums, in contrast, can reflect some disagreement with the 
outcome of policies designed by the representative system. Bottom-up democracy 
allows citizens to become veto players in the process of changing legislative status 
quo (Hug and Tsebelis 2002). Popular initiatives allow citizens to become innovators 
by proposing a new pieces of legislation or raising a neglected policy (Serdült and 
Welp 2012). Accordingly, they are viewed as a disruptive process by those in power 
since “popular initiatives introduce a dose of uncertainty and unexpectedly upset the 
political agenda,” while for citizens, it is another means of making their voice heard 
(Papadopoulos 1995). Hence, bottom-up democracy contributes to citizens’ empow-
erment, supports responsiveness and accountability reducing the distance between 
citizens’ preferences and actions of their representatives (Schiller 2012).
As a consequence, a similar effect is observed in political systems where direct-
democratic procedures from below are broadly used—the general trend toward con-
sensus, integrating various interests and opposition groups into the decision-making 
process (Papadopoulos 2001; Marxer and Pallinger 2009). Besides, studies show 
that the level of satisfaction with the development of the country and its perceived 
legitimacy by the citizens is positively affected by the availability of referendum 
options (Hug 2005; Gherghina 2017).
Depending on the function that a single referendum fulfills for its initiator, dif-
ferent typologies have been introduced. Some differentiate between decision-con-
trolling and decision-promoting referendums (Gallagher 1996). Decision-promoting 
referendums are typically initiated by a political actor seeking to have their pro-
posal approved. Decision-controlling referendums, on contrary, are seen as a check 
mechanism on a legislative change since they are not initiated by the proposer of the 
policy that is voted upon. Elite-initiated referendums usually fall within the category 
of decision-promoting referendums. Citizen-initiated votes exhibit features of both: 
popular initiatives that put forward a new piece of legislation serve as a decision-
promoting tool, while abrogative and rejective referendums that challenge previ-
ously passed legislation—as decision-controlling.
There is a distinction in the literature between controlled and uncontrolled ref-
erendums that are either pro-hegemonic or anti-hegemonic (Smith 1976). In most 
cases, bottom-up referendums fall under uncontrolled and anti-hegemonic since their 
whole point is to bring about changes that are resisted by the government, while 
most top-down referendums fall under controlled (by elite) and pro-hegemonic—
strengthening their position. There is some sort of consensus among the scholars 
that the most powerful and important tool of direct democracy is the popular initia-
tive that has the strongest anti-hegemonic character even compared to other bottom-
up processes. Originating in part of the electorate—not a political institution, this 
instrument of “popular law-making” is a dynamic means to chip into the decision-
making process from outside, bypassing the gatekeepers—established parliamentary 
channels (Papadopoulos 1995, 2001; Marxer and Pallinger 2009).
However, referendum initiation is a costly endeavor that requires high financial 
and human resources. In all types of referendum, elite and political parties con-
tinue to play a central role, the only difference being the level of control and nature 
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of limitations (Rahat 2009). Referendums are often influenced by various interest 
groups, NGOs, trade unions or the church. Moreover, in some cases, even popular 
initiatives are organized by established political parties after failing to achieve their 
objectives via representative channels. For instance, the Ukrainian referendum in 
2000 seeking to reinforce presidential powers originated from a collection of signa-
tures. However, the process was organized by the country president and his support-
ers (Serdült and Welp 2012).
Hypotheses
This brief literature review indicates that elite- and citizen-initiated referendums 
rest on different logics. Accordingly, we expect the same factors to have contrasting 
effects on the likelihood for referendums initiated by elites or by citizens. This sub-
section argues and tests the potential impact of four variables: government composi-
tion, degree of democracy, experience with the use of referendums and contagion 
effect. All hypotheses marked with “a” are for the elites, while those with “b” are for 
citizens.
To start with the government composition, the essential distinction lies between 
a single- and multi-party government. Being in government allows politicians to 
decide and implement policies. Many political parties seek a good performance in 
office that can ensure re-election and eventually continuity in office (Sartori 1976; 
Gunther and Diamond 2003). Parties have control over policies and have more 
opportunities to forge a positive image among the electorate when they form the 
government alone. They have a high level of policy influence that can make people 
recognize when they fulfill their election pledges (Pétry and Duval 2018). Parties 
that do not share the power may resort to referendums to alter domestic policies 
both when they have a parliamentary majority and when they are in minority. When 
single government parties are backed by parliamentary majority, they can use ref-
erendums to illustrate that the opinion of the public matters. Although they have 
the power to make any changes with the help of majority, the referendums ensure 
the component of popular legitimacy. When there is a minority single party govern-
ment, its elites may use referendums to bypass an adversarial legislature (Gherghina 
2017). In  situations with single-party government, opposition parties may also be 
inclined to propose referendums to counter-balance the government strength and 
seek to amend legislation in other ways than in parliament.
In coalition governments, there is uncertainty between the partners and com-
mitment problems occur often (Bäck and Lindvall 2015). Coalition partners find 
it difficult to reach consensus over policies due to ideological differences or pol-
icy priorities. Negotiations and compromise among the coalition partners do not 
necessarily lead to policy agreement, which often result in no change (Fischer 
2014). In such a situation, the population may step in and initiate a referendum to 
achieve the policy change. Moreover, due to ideological differences within coali-
tions, the partners cannot conduct consistent campaigns. For example, if the gov-
ernment elites call for a referendum, the coalition may not belong to the same 
camp (Qvortrup 2018; Gherghina 2019). Each party will seek to mobilize their 
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electorate, which will result in different vote choices if the parties have diverging 
interests. Opposition parties may also be reluctant to call for referendums because 
the classic division with government parties will not be obvious. Under these cir-
cumstances, citizens may use referendums to articulate their policy preferences, 
to move beyond the partisan inactivity. Consequently, we expect that:
H1a A single-party government favors the use of referendums on domestic policies 
by political elites.
H1b A coalition of parties in government favors the use of referendums on domestic 
policies by the citizens.
The level of democracy is expected to influence the use of direct-democratic 
tools. In non-democratic countries, referendum is another piece of the authoritar-
ian machinery, as rigged as elections (Morel 2018). Accordingly, referendum is 
used serves solely for the purpose of guarding the interests of the ruler, enhanc-
ing their power and simultaneously demonstrating their legitimacy, both domesti-
cally and internationally (Qvortrup 2017). The nations in transition are different 
because they undergo a simultaneous threefold transformation: territorial, politi-
cal and economic (Offe 1991). With the ongoing large-scale system change, only 
major policies related to substantial political, electoral or constitutional matters 
are subjected to popular vote. According to the dataset used in this article (see the 
research design), in those countries, 13% of all referendums are initiated by citi-
zens. These are transitions from repressive regimes and thus with underdeveloped 
civil society.
In the case of democracies, we expect different mechanisms. First, an increas-
ing number of democratic countries adopted provisions for bottom-up referen-
dums serving as safety valves of political pressure (Altman 2011). Moreover, 
established democracies dispose the necessary cultural prerequisites for active 
citizen participation—well-developed civil society structures with strong network 
of grassroots organizations. Besides, most of the developed societies have expe-
rienced shift of values toward post-materialism and one of its components is par-
ticipatory element (Inglehart 1989). Democracies offer an appropriate framework 
for bottom-up activities: they are designed in such a way that its members have 
a say in politics. As such, the referendum is not monopolized by one political 
actor but also used by various groups, including institutional minorities (opposi-
tion parties). The latter have legal and institutional instruments to become active 
agents in the decision-making process by articulating their interests and mobiliz-
ing citizens. Following this line of argumentation, we hypothesize that:
H2a Less democratic countries are likely to use top-down referendums on domestic 
policies by political elites.
H2b More democratic countries are likely to use bottom-up referendums on domes-
tic policies.
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Lijphart (1984) argued three decades ago that governments that control the refer-
endum will use it when they expect to win. If policy-makers associate referendums 
with an efficient tool of decision-making process, they are more likely to apply it 
frequently. A recent study of national level referendums held in the last two centu-
ries shows that this is empirically the case in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
regimes. In these two types of regimes, the referendums are adopted in 95%, respec-
tively, 80% of cases (Silagadze and Gherghina 2020). Such a rate of adoption sug-
gests the self-reinforcing circle: elite initiate referendums, they mostly win them that 
encourages them to initiate more. Another argument for which experience with ref-
erendums is likely to encourage the political elites to use more referendums is that 
the use of referendums can be a source of subjective regime legitimacy in Europe 
(Gherghina 2017). The results indicate that when people have the possibility to vote 
in referendums, they trust more the regime and comply with the role of their institu-
tions. Politicians have the reasons to continue this tradition of referendums in order 
to maintain a high level of legitimacy among citizens.
In societies or times when referendums are not frequently used, this might 
become an appealing instrument for citizenry to check on the representative sys-
tem, to supply input from the grassroots. There may be various reasons for rare 
use of referendums—among others if the elite does not view it as the best means 
to coming to the desired outcome or if no consensus could be reached over its 
application. In addition, having a touch of novelty, citizens might feel more opti-
mistic and eager to make use of initiatives. Accordingly, we expect that:
H3a High experience with referendums favors the use of referendums on domestic 
policies by political elites.
H3b Less experience with referendums favors the use of referendums on domestic 
policies by citizenry.
Political events in neighboring countries may matter. There are two reasons why 
policy-makers and citizens could pay attention to politics of their neighbors: (1) they 
share some common values, are familiar with the culture, and enjoy cross-mixing 
of media; (2) neighboring countries compete between each other trying to maintain 
the same level of services (Mooney 2001). Moreover, one source of policy change is 
the policy-oriented learning that is achieved either by the evaluation of former poli-
cies or the evaluation of policies from abroad (Sabatier 1987, 1998). The latter can 
be reflected in a potential influence that referendums on a similar policy might have 
for the neighboring country. Elites are often quite hesitant or cautious to follow the 
example of neighboring countries. It is in their interest to let time pass and observe 
the consequences of referendums to optimize the learning effect. This holds true for 
both scenarios: if the referendum was adopted, the elites can assess the implementa-
tion and its effects on the system; if it failed, the elites can evaluate what went wrong 
and what mistakes to avoid in similar referendums. Since the instrument of direct 
democracy is easily available, there is no need for the elite to haste and mimic the 
actions of their neighbors promptly.
 S. Gherghina, N. Silagadze 
The dynamic of citizen-initiated referendums is the opposite. Due to vast human 
and financial resources required by such referendums, the civil society has a good 
chance to mobilize the electorate when the topic is salient and widely discussed in 
the media, usually in the aftermath of a referendum in a neighboring country. The 
ongoing debate helps to agitate and mobilize interest groups, people are eager and 
inspired to act immediately. As the time passes, the interest might fade with it. Thus, 
we expect that:
H4a Longer time passed from a referendum on a similar topic in a neighboring 
country favors the use of referendums on domestic policies by political elites.
H4b A recent referendum on a similar topic in a neighboring country favors the use 
of referendums on domestic policies by citizens.
Controls
In addition to these main effects, we also test for two control variables: ideology of 
the party in government and external shocks. These are considered by earlier stud-
ies as potential determinants for policy change and referendum process, but no clear 
causal relationship has been identified. There is an extensive literature devoted to 
various topics around ideology and its influence on policy outcomes. There are cer-
tain topics that are closer either to the left or right camp, for instance, left-wing 
prioritize public welfare over economic growth, while right-wing parties place eco-
nomic growth in a more important position (Wen et  al. 2016). An analysis of 25 
countries between 1945 and 1998 shows that the left put emphasis on peaceful inter-
nationalism, welfare, expansion of education and government intervention, while 
the right focused on strong defense, free enterprise and traditional morality (Budge 
and Klingemann 2001).
Shocks and crises may play a pivotal role in policy change and referendum is just 
one means of the policy change. According to Grossman (2015), “typically, the pro-
cess [of change] begins with a notable exogenous event, a shock. Often, the shock 
leads to what is perceived to be a crisis”. Keeler (1993) explains: “A crisis can create 
a sense of urgency … [that] allows for unusually rapid acceptance of reform propos-
als intended to resolve the crisis.” Various studies show that major policy changes 
were preceded by a notable external stimulus (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010; Gross-
man 2015). Saurugger and Terpan (2016) confirm that the more severe the crisis, the 
bigger is the window for changes.3
3 We also control for other variables such as the binding character of the referendum, adoption of legisla-
tive provisions regarding referendums, turnout or outcome of previous referendums. None of these have a 
strong or statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. For reasons of parsimony, we report in 
the article the model with the two controls that have a higher effect.
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Research design
To test these effects, we use an original dataset consisting of all 461 elite and citi-
zen-initiated referendums at national level held between 1793 and 2019 in Europe. 
Similar to earlier studies (Qvortrup 2014a; Gherghina 2019), this article considers 
a referendum as corresponding to one policy decision that citizens have to make. 
One referendum is one question to which the citizens have to answer on the bal-
lot. If there are more questions asked the same day, we count them as different ref-
erendums. This conceptualization allows us to separate between referendums with 
different initiators (elite vs citizens) organized the same day. The distribution of 
referendums across the two types of initiators is almost equally split: 238 were initi-
ated by the elites and 223 were called by citizens. There are 43 countries included 
in the analysis out of which two no longer exist as countries: Czechoslovakia and 
the Soviet Union.4 The unit of analysis is the national referendum, and all variables 
were collected and analyzed at this level. The analyzed referendums form the entire 
universe of cases, and they are not a sample. All the results presented in this article 
reflect the reality in Europe, without running the danger of not being generalizable.
The area selected for analysis is domestic policies, which includes the constitu-
tional, political system and interior policy categories. The logic behind this group-
ing refers to the general political architecture of the society with its fundamental 
norms and principles anchored in the constitution, to more specific regulations and 
practices manifested in the interior legislation, and to the “rules of the game” defin-
ing the political and electoral landscape. The theoretical reasons behind this selec-
tion is that this policy area includes many salient policies for both elites and citizens. 
The latter are likely to make their voice heard in policies that immediately affect 
their life. The empirical reason behind the selection is that roughly half of all ref-
erendums called since 1793 are on domestic policies (235 out of 461). Among the 
elite-initiated referendums, they represent 54% of the total (129 out of 238), while 
among the citizen-initiated referendums, the ones on domestic policies are 48% (106 
out of 223). The other policy areas in which referendums were called throughout 
history are international system (including foreign affairs), welfare policies, and 
post-materialist issues—environmental topics, questions related to media and moral/
ethical issues (Silagadze and Gherghina 2020).5
The dependent variable of this study is the initiation of a referendum in the area 
of domestic policies. This is coded dichotomously with 1 for all instances in which 
such a referendum was called and 0 when referendums on other topics were called. 
The first independent variable is the number of parties in government (H1) and it 
is coded as a dummy variable with value 1 for a single party in government and 2 
4 Since legal provisions for referendums and initiatives vary considerably across countries, we would 
like to call attention to the fact that although the analysis includes a great variety of countries, these are 
all the countries that allow for a referendum or citizen-initiative in the first place.
5 We would like to highlight that our choice to focus on domestic policies and not on other three policy 
domains is driven by a combination of theoretical and empirical reasons. However, this does not translate 
into the view that some topics are more important / salient for a society that others.
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for a coalition of parties. Ideally, the coding could differentiate between the num-
ber of parties in the coalition. This is a very difficult task because for some coali-
tions—especially in the early twentieth century—there is no information about the 
composition of government. In other cases, there was contradictory information 
about the number of parties in government and no reliable source could be followed. 
Many authoritarian regimes were coded as a single-party government since in such 
institutional settings government speaks with one voice, political pluralism is non-
existent. The technocratic governments were dropped from the analysis because they 
are dominated by independent members of cabinet. For example, the referendums 
organized in Russia in the end of 1993 was under a government appointed by the 
state president after a political crisis in the fall of the same year. The vast majority of 
cabinet members did not belong to political parties.
The degree of democracy (H2) is an ordinal measure on a three-point scale: 1 for 
authoritarian regimes, 2 for transition countries and 3 for democracies. The point 
of reference is the moment at which the referendum takes place. The assessment is 
based on a plurality of sources such as the established indices of Freedom House, 
V-dem and Polity IV. For all countries that are not covered by these indices, we use 
a review of the secondary literature covering case studies or the opinions of scholars 
in those countries (e.g., historians, political scientists). The experience with referen-
dums (H3) is a dichotomous variable coded with 1 if the country organized referen-
dums in the previous five years and 0 if no such referendum was organized.
The contagion effect (H4) is measured as the time elapsed between the referen-
dums in a neighboring country in the last five years. The variable is coded on a six-
point ordinal scale with the following values: no referendum (0), referendum five 
years before (1), referendum four years before (2), referendum three years before (3), 
referendum two years before (4), referendum the year before (5) and referendum the 
same year (6). This measurement seeks to capture a potential influence of a neigh-
boring country on the decision to call for a referendum. For both variables in H3 and 
H4, we use a five-year period imitation or influence as it is difficult to assess beyond 
this point. We checked the methodological robustness of this threshold by altering 
the values (e.g., 4, 6, 7, etc.), and there are similar results.
The first control variable is government ideology, measured on a nine-point ordi-
nal scale that corresponds to the party families. The scale ranges between extreme 
left (1) and extreme right (9). Most data come from the ParlGov database, and for 
cases that are not included in the database, we use secondary literature and experts, 
i.e., political scientists from those countries. For single-party government, the ideol-
ogy is usually straightforward. For coalitions, we use the ideology of the formateur 
when there is a large or dominant party in the coalition. If there are two parties with 
relatively equal strength, we use the average of their ideological stances; these are 
rare cases and usually the parties are ideologically quite close. We drop the cases 
in which the government ideology is difficult to determine, e.g., referendums in San 
Marino before 1906 since the first parliamentary elections took place that year; until 
then, the country was governed by a Council composed by the heads of the Great 
families.
The second control variable refers to the existence of external shocks that could 
have determined the elites or citizens to call for a referendum. An example of 
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external shock is the disintegration of a federation, which asks for independence 
referendums. The external shocks are coded dichotomously: 1 if there is one dur-
ing three years prior to the referendum, 0 for no external shock. The time frame 
for external shocks is shorter than for contagion effect due to the nature of shocks 
that demand / require immediate reaction in order to prevent a more severe crisis; 
the time span for lagged effect is rather curtailed. The variation for each variable is 
available in “Appendix 1” for the elite-initiated referendums and in “Appendix 2” for 
the citizen-initiated referendums.
The empirical testing presented in the following section proceeds in two steps. 
We start the analysis with a bivariate correlation that allows us to draw some prelim-
inary conclusions about the relationships between the variables. The presented coef-
ficients are the result of nonparametric correlations due to the ordinal measurement 
of most variables. We continue with a binary logistic regression with two separate 
models for each of the two types of referendums: one without and one with controls. 
The regression coefficients are odds ratios for a simpler interpretation of results.
Government composition, democracy and experience 
with referendums
The theoretical section argues that there are reasons to expect that political elites and 
citizens call referendums under different circumstances. In practice, for the national-
level referendums in Europe, the effects are similar for half of the hypotheses. The 
correlation coefficients in Table 1 indicate that fewer parties in government, authori-
tarian countries, more experience with referendums and the longer time passed from 
a similar referendum in a neighboring country favors the use of referendums by the 
elites. There is fairly limited evidence for H1a in the expected direction, and the 
relationship is weak. The empirical support for H2a is the strongest, being also sta-
tistically significant at the 0.01 level. Since the analysis includes the entire universe 
of cases, the statistical significance cannot be used to generalize from the sample to 
the broader population but instead can be meaningful for the future addition of new 
Table 1  Correlations between 
referendums on domestic policy 
and the other variables
Correlation coefficients are nonparametric (Spearman)
For ideology N = 211
**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05
Political elites Citizens
Number of parties in government − 0.04 0.04
Democracy status − 0.32** − 0.24**
Experience with referendums 0.09 − 0.17**
Contagion effect − 0.16* − 0.06
Government ideology 0.06 0.01
External shocks − 0.17** − 0.01
N 238 223
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cases. The statistically significant relationships could predict more reliably what will 
happen when new referendums are initiated. The controls indicate that right lean-
ing governments are slightly more likely to accommodate elite-driven referendums. 
The absence of external shocks also favors elite-driven referendums, the correlation 
coefficient having a similar size with the contagion effect (or its absence), being also 
statistically significant.
For the citizens-initiated referendums on domestic policies, the coefficients pro-
vide strong empirical support only for one hypothesis: less experience with referen-
dums (H3b). There is weak empirical support for H1b according to which coalition 
governments favor the existence of more bottom-up referendums on domestic poli-
cies. However, the coefficient is fairly small. The other two variables go against the 
hypothesized direction: less democratic countries have more referendums called by 
citizens unlike what expected in theory (H3b). This result is driven by the fact that 
all citizen-initiated referendums in transition countries were on domestic policies. 
In democracies citizens called referendums on various topics. Similarly, the longer 
time passed from a referendum on a similar topic in a neighboring country in the 
previous five years favors the emergence of a bottom-up referendum (H4). This hap-
pens to a lower extent than in the case of elite-initiated referendums, but in the same 
direction. The government ideology and external shocks are not statistically related 
to the extent to which citizens call for domestic policy referendums in Europe.
We run two separate models of binary logistic regression: one without controls 
(Model 1) and one with controls (Model 2), presented in details in “Appendix 3..” 
Figure 1 depicts the effects for Model 2. The results confirm to a great extent the 
results of the bivariate correlations but there are also some nuanced findings. One 
of these is that the first hypothesis finds empirical support only for the referendums 
called by citizens (H1b). The data indicates that coalition governments are more 
 
Note: The effect of democracy on citizen-initiated referendums is not represented because it is 







0 1 2 3 4
Odds ratio
Elite-initiated Citizen-initiated
Fig. 1  The effects on elite- and citizen-initiated referendums on domestic policies
Calling referendums on domestic policies: how political elites…
favorable across the board to referendums on domestic policies compared to single-
party governments. This happens with citizen-initiated referendums, as expected in 
theory, but also with the referendums initiated by the political elites. Citizens are 
1.5 times more likely to call for a referendum on domestic policies under a coali-
tion government, while political elites are roughly two times more likely to do so 
(Fig. 1). One explanation for this finding is that not only the government initiates 
referendums, but also the parliament or the president. Even if the government is 
composed of one party and decides not to call for a referendum, the parliamentary 
opposition or the country president—especially if it is a situation of co-habitation 
in which the president comes from another party than the head of the cabinet—can 
call referendums. Another explanation is that coalition governments have a plurality 
of voices and some of these may wish to submit issues to referendums. For exam-
ple, this is the case with the 2015 referendum against same-sex marriage in Slova-
kia where the Christian-Democrats, the minor coalition partner, pushed for it. They 
were supported by the larger social democratic partner who in theory have a differ-
ent opinion on the matter, i.e., equality, inclusion.
The regression analysis finds empirical support forH2a according to which in less 
democratic countries the political elites are more likely to call for domestic policy 
referendums. The latter plays the role of legitimizing tools for the political elites, 
and they are willing to use them especially in a context in which citizens do not 
have the right to initiate referendums. There is no effect of a country’s democracy 
status on the likelihood to have citizens calling for referendum on domestic policies. 
One possible explanation for the lack of a relationship is the empirical observation 
from our dataset according to which in democracies citizens initiate referendums 
on a variety of topics. The data for the 461 referendums shows that out of a total 
of 212 bottom-up referendums in democratic countries, 117 were on other topics 
than domestic policies. This happens because areas concerning domestic policies 
are functional and regulated by the political system in democracies, and referendums 
do not have to be called by citizens. The absence of citizen-initiated referendums in 
authoritarian countries adds to the general picture.
Hypotheses H3a and H3b find empirical support as described in the theoretical 
section. Figure  2 illustrates the divergent effects that experience of referendums 
has for the two types of referendums. Both axes are on a 0–1 scale, and the mar-
ginal effect is straightforward to interpret. In countries where other referendums 
were organized in a time frame of five years, the political elite is 1.5 times more 
likely to call a referendum on domestic policies compared to other types of poli-
cies. Under similar conditions, the citizens are 1.5 times less likely to call a referen-
dum on domestic policies compared to other types of policies.6 When referendums 
on domestic policies are already organized by the elite, citizens might redirect their 
attention to other salient topics. For instance, Italy held a top-down referendum in 
2001 on greater legislative powers to the regions. The subsequent referendums ini-
tiated by the citizens targeted completely different areas: unjustified dismissals in 
small enterprises (2003) or embryonic research and artificial insemination (2005).
6 For citizens, we use a logarithmic interpretation of the odds-ratio since its value is lower than 1.
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The evidence indicates that the longer time passed from a referendum on a similar 
topic in a neighboring country favors the use of referendums on domestic policies 
by political elites (H4a). This indicates that politicians adapt to the situation in the 
country rather than being inspired and replicating the behavior of their neighbors. 
This is applicable at least with respect to domestic policies. For instance, the Ice-
landic referendum of 2012 on a new constitution was completely isolated from the 
politics in the neighboring countries and had internal reasons. For nearly 70-years, 
Iceland’s political elite did not revise the 1944 provisional constitution. In the wake 
of protests in late 2008 and early 2009, the process of constitutional revision was 
initiated and people had a popular vote on the new constitution several years later. 
The same pattern, but with a smaller effect size, can be observed for citizen-initiated 
referendums. One explanation for which this goes against the hypothesized rela-
tionship is that it takes time to mobilize citizens especially when different interest 
groups are involved. In addition, many hurdles have to be overcome before a refer-
endum can take place: after collecting the required number of signatures, the parlia-
ment often has to approve and sometimes the decision faces a court. For example, 
the 2016 Bulgarian referendum on changing the electoral system was initiated by a 
well-known showman. Initially, there were six questions on the ballot, the president 
referred to the Constitutional Court questioning the legality of three questions, and 
there were left only three.
The effects for controls (Fig. 1) indicate that slightly more referendums are called 
by both political elites and citizens on domestic policies when the government is 
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Fig. 2  The marginal effects of experience with referendums
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interpretation of the results. Our empirical observation for the referendums inves-
tigated in this article is that left-wing governments favored referendums on other 
topics. Quite often, this occurred in a context in which the domestic issues were set-
tled and other elements, e.g., international affairs or post-materialist issues, became 
salient in society.
The absence of an external shock has a positive effect on calling referendums on 
domestic policies: the elites are two times more likely to call a referendum without 
an external shock, while citizens are 1.5 times more likely to follow the same avenue 
under the same circumstances. There are two possible explanations for this. First, 
the literature indicating the effect of external shock on policy change stems mainly 
from environmental studies, and popular votes on environmental issues are not part 
of domestic policies. Second, shocks require immediate action, while referendums 
are not the fastest tool for change. The process of its initiation, campaign and imple-
mentation takes longer than enacting legislations through other means, e.g., adop-
tion in parliament or executive decree.
Conclusion
This article aimed to explain under what circumstances political elites and citizens 
call national level referendums on domestic policies in Europe. It tested the effect 
of four institutional variables that in theory is expected to be divergent for the two 
types of initiators. Some findings confirm the theoretical expectations and indicate 
that the experience with referendums and the democratic status of a country influ-
ence political elites and citizens in different directions. Other results confirm the the-
oretical expectations only for one of the two types of initiators. Longer time passed 
from referendums in a neighboring country explains the elite-initiated referendums 
on domestic policies. The coalition governments are also more prone to citizen-initi-
ated referendums on domestic policies compared to single-party governments.
At the same time, the analysis indicates that there are some factors that have a 
similar effect on the two types of initiators. These are the existence of coalition gov-
ernments and the longer time passed from a referendum on a similar policy in a 
neighboring country. To these, we can add the two controls, which go in the same 
direction for both initiators: right-wing governments and the absence of external 
shocks favor the referendums on domestic policies from political elites and citizens 
to a similar extent. These results form the basis for two broad observations. First, 
the institutions have an impact on the decision to call for a referendum on domestic 
policies. The composition of the government, the democratic status of the country 
and the previous use of referendums are important predictors. Equally important, 
referendums on domestic policies are often initiated in a quiet external environment 
in which a referendum-oriented behavior of the neighbors and shocks are not rel-
evant. These point in the direction of referendums being called when the domestic 
situation requires a decision rather than copying or reacting to external factors. Sec-
ond, in practice, the European political elites and citizens are driven by several com-
mon factors in their decisions to call for domestic policy referendums. In spite of a 
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divergent logic in the initiation process, the same variables facilitate or impede the 
use of referendums, e.g., coalition governments.
These findings have broad relevance for the study of referendums. The theoreti-
cal implication of this analysis is that the setting of national institutions and what 
happens within the country can explain the use of referendums on domestic policies 
much better than external factors. This conclusion can be a good point of depar-
ture for future analyses that look at determinants of referendums in comparative or 
single-case studies. These results show that institutional learning, mimetism and 
reactive behavior are less important in explaining referendums compared to the 
composition of the government or adaptation to the rules of direct democracy. This 
provides solid grounds to include the latter into theoretical explanatory models. The 
methodological lesson of this analysis is the possibility to conduct cross-country 
and longitudinal studies if referendums are analyzed according to policy areas. Our 
focus on domestic policies allowed the inclusion of many policies that spread for 
more than two centuries in Europe. Empirically, we learned that there are differ-
ences between the political elites and citizens as initiators of referendums, but there 
are also things that bring them together. Such an observation contributes to the lit-
erature on referendums in two ways. First, it strengthens the idea that politicians and 
citizens have different stakes in referendums. Second, it narrows the areas in which 
discrepancies in the politicians and citizens’ approaches differ by indicating shared 
determinants for their actions.
The emphasis on these dynamics reveals two main avenues for further research. 
The unexpected findings for citizen-initiated referendum suggest that it is impor-
tant to investigate the exact mechanisms behind their initiation. One way would be 
to disentangle the category of domestic policies and look into the patterns within 
each component (constitutional issues, electoral and political system, and interior 
policies), alternatively detailed case studies might shed light on so far unknown fac-
tors. There is also potential for wider research by expanding the analysis beyond the 




Table 2  Descriptive statistics of 
the variables (political elites)
Mean SE Min Max N
Referendum on domestic policy 0.54 0.03 0 1 238
Number of parties in government 1.66 0.03 1 2 229
Democracy status 2.45 0.05 1 3 238
Experience with referendums 0.49 0.03 0 1 238
Contagion effect 1.33 0.15 0 6 238
Government ideology 4.99 0.20 1 9 211
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics of 
the variables (citizens)
Mean SE Min Max N
Referendum on domestic policy 0.48 0.03 0 1 238
Number of parties in government 1.83 0.03 1 2 229
Democracy status 2.95 0.02 1 3 238
Experience with referendums 0.86 0.02 0 1 238
Contagion effect 0.64 0.11 0 6 238
Government ideology 5.66 0.16 1 9 238
External shocks 0.93 0.02 0 1 238
Table 4  Binary logistic regression for referendums on domestic policy
All coefficients are odds ratios
**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05
Political elites Citizens
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Number of parties in government 1.18 (0.33) 1.95* (0.38) 1.47 (0.42) 1.53 (0.44)
Democracy status 0.32** (0.24) 0.33** (0.25) 1.00 (1.25) 1.00 (1.17)
Experience with referendums 1.52 (0.30) 1.52 (0.33) 0.71 (0.46) 0.71 (0.46)
Contagion effect 0.83** (0.07) 0.83** (0.08) 0.91 (0.09) 0.93 (0.09)
Government ideology 1.08 (0.06) 1.09 (0.06)
External shocks 0.48 (0.46) 0.75 (0.55)
N 238 211 223 211
Pseudo  R2 0.21 0.22 0.12 0.13
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